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RECENT CASES
AGENCY- LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR SERVANT'S
PERMIT TO OPERATE
ACTS -STATE

Defendant entered into a lease agreement for the use of the driver's
truck and services, the vehicle to be under the complete control of
the lessee and the lessee's, responsibility to last only so long as the
vehicle was being operated on the specified routes. Defendant held
a ten day permit from the State of Kansas to operate lessor's vehicle
while on its business. Lessor-driver, after delivering freight for defendant, deviated from his route on a personal mission but was back on
his route as specified when he negligently killed plaintiff's minor child.
Plaintiff sued defendant and its insurer; the trial court found the
lessor-driver alone liable on the ground that his employment had ceased
with the expiration of the lease agreement. Held, reversed. The lease
agreement was interpreted as not having expired, thus maintaining
the master-servant relationship. Although the driver had deviated
from his employment with the defendant, the driver was back within
the scope of his original employment; and the expiration of the state
permit did not affect the lessee's liability. Marriott v. National Mutual
Casualty Co., 195 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1952 ).
Generally the master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant;'
in order to fix liability on the master the servant's acts must be within
the scope of his employment.2 Most cases hold that a driver is beyond
the scope of his employment when he deviates from a specified route,
but may again be within the scope thereof when he returns to the
original route. With certain exceptions, however, the master is under
no liability for the negligence of an independent contractor.' In de1. Cf. Consolidated Motors v. Ketcham, 49 Ariz. 295, 66 P.2d 246 (1937).
"If a servant by his negligence does any damage to a stranger, the master
shall answer for his neglect." 1 BL. CoMM. *431. "A master is subject to
liability for injuries caused by the tortious conduct of his servants within the
scope of their employment." PROSsER, TORTS 473 (1941). See RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 219 (1934).
2. Larkins v. Utah Copper Co., 169 Ore. 499, 127 P.2d 354 (1942). See 7-8
HUDDY, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAw § 138 (9th ed. 1931): "A master or
employer may be liable for the negligence of his servant or employee in the
course of his employment, though the employee is using his own car."

3. See, e.g., Hodges v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1943); Barmore
v. Vicksburg St. P. Ry., 85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 210 (1905); Riley v. Standard
Oil Co., 231 N.Y. 301, 132 N.E. 97, 22 A.L.R. 1382 (1921); cf. Edwards v. Earnest,
206 Ala. 1, 89 So. 729 (1921); Sanders Ex'rs v. Armour & Co., 220 Ky. 719,
295 S.W. 1014 (1927). For a good discussion of this particular problem see

Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COL. L. REV. 444 & 716 (1923).
4. Cf. Atlanta & F.R.R. v. Kimberly, 87 Ga. 161, 13 S.E. 277 (1891); Pickett
v. Waldorf System, Inc., 241 Mass. 569, 136 N.E. 64, 23 A.L.R. 1014 (1922).
For the rule on liability of employer of independent contractor and exceptions thereto, see PRoSsER, TORTS 483 (1941).
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termining which relationship exists the courts look to control as the
paramount test.'
In the instant case the primary question considered by the court was
the relationship between the driver and the defendant.' And in the
interpretation of the lease the right of control held over the driver
was clearly the decisive factor in finding the existence of the masterservant relationship.' The court, following the general rule, held that
the driver was within the scope of his employment.8 It further found
that the expiration of the permit before the accident did not relieve
the master of his liability to third persons.'
Where the master has a state permit to operate the lessor-driver's
truck upon public highways, there appears to be an exception to the
rule of nonliability for the acts of independent contractors. Some
courts hold that possession of such state authority by the master places
liability upon him10 despite the independent contractor relationship. 1
This rule seems to be based upon the theory that there is public
policy for maintaining such liability by virtue of the public nature of
the operation of a transportation company." At least one court has held
freight trucks intrinsically dangerous when operated on public highways. "
It has been held that where no terms of control are stipulated by the
lessee in a lease agreement the relationship would be that of employer and independent contractor.1 ' Since there was enough question
as to the presence of a master-servant relationship in this case for the
lower court to deny its existence, it would appear that the court might
5. Accord, Lee Moore Contracting Co. v. Blanton, 49 Ariz. 130, 65 P.2d 35
(1937); cf. Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 10 Sup. Ct. 175,
33 L. Ed. 440 (1889); Balinovic v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 113 F.2d 505
(D.C. Cir. 1940); Dobson's Case, 124 Me. 305, 128 Atl. 401 (1925). "A servant is
a person employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who,
with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is
subject to the others' control or right to control." RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §
220(1) (1933).
6. 195 F.2d at 465.
7. 195 F.2d at 465. While the driver was reporting the accident to the defendant, employees of the defendant were loading the truck for another trip.
This indicated further control over the driver.
8. 195 F.2d at 466.
9. The court, by indicating that the liability of the defendant stemmed
from the agreement, held that the expiration before the accident of the
master's authority from the state to operate on the highways would not
relieve the master of its liability to third persons.
10. Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1941); Balinovic v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 113 F.2d. 505 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Hodges v. Johnson, 52
F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1943).
11. Bates Motor Transport Lines, Inc. v. Mayer, 213 Ind. 664, 14 N.E.2d
91 (1938); Duncan v. Evans, 60 Ohio App. 265, 20 N.E.2d 729 (1937); Stickel
v. Erie Motor Freight, Inc., 54 Ohio App. 74, 6 N.E.2d 15 (1936).
12. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 428, comment a (1934).
13. Cf. Joel v. Morrison, 6 C. & P. 501 (N.P. 1834). See Smith, Frolic and
Detour, 23 CoL. L. REv. 444 & 716 (1923).
14. Houdek v. Gloyd, 152 Kan. 789, 107 P.2d 751 (1940).
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well have reached the same result on firmer grounds had it based
its ruling upon the theory that the state permit made the master
liable for the acts of the lessee driver as an independent contractor.
The public policy consideration appears a better basis for liability
than an extension of the master-servant relationship.
AGENCY -POSSESSION AS INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP
Plaintiff was the owner of a diamond ring which he entrusted to T
to sell for him. Principal and agent orally agreed that T's period of
agency was to last for seven days. T, representing himself to be the
owner of the ring, sold it to defendants for value after the termination
of his authority to sell. Plaintiff sued defendants for conversion. Held,
defendants are liable. At the time of sale T was not plaintiff's agent
to sell the ring and plaintiff did not enable T to mislead the defendants
by giving him possession of the ring. T was, in fact, a converter by
his sale and could not pass good title to defendants. Jerome v. Bentley
and Co., [1952] 2 Q.B. 114.
Cases concerning the conflicting rights of an owner and a bona fide
purchaser from owner's fraudulent agent arise in two ways. The
purchaser may deal with the agent as such. In doing so he may rely on
the "apparent authority" of the agent, i.e., that which the principal
holds his agent out as having, to third parties.1 Secondly, the bona
fide purchaser may deal with the agent as an owner. In this situation
the buyer does not rely on the agent's "apparent authority" to represent anyone. The only relevant question is whether he can sell as
owner.'
An agent, who is dealt with as an owner, cannot divest the true
owner of title, unless the latter has estopped himself.' Estoppel may
arise if the principal gives this person ostensible ownership of the
property thus enabling him to commit fraud by appearing as owner.'
The true owner then cannot recover against a bona fide purchaser.'
The court in the instant case said that the plaintiff had not enabled
his agent to appear as owner by giving him possession of the ring."
1. MEcHEM, OUTLINES or AGENCY § 247 (3d ed. 1923); Ferson, Bases for
Master's Liability and for Principal'sLiability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L.
REV. 260 (1951).
2. See 2 Am. Jui., Agency § 103 (1936), and cases cited therein. See Note,
95 A.L.R. 1319 (1935), for collection of cases on this question.
3. See note 4 infra.
4. E1FCucm, AGENCY § 168 (2d ed. 1901); MEcHEM, OUTLINES or AGENCY §
262 (3d ed. 1923); 2 WILuSTON, SALES § 312 (Rev. ed. 1948).
5. Cowdrey v. Vandenburgh, 101 U.S. 572, 25 L. Ed. 923 (1879); Rosser
v. Darden, 82 Ga. 219, 7 S.E. 919 (1888); Baily v. Hoover, 233 Ky. 681, 26 S.W.2d
522 (1930); Berkshire Glass Co. v. Wolcott, 84 Mass. 227 (1861); Cairns v.
Pepper, 133 Pa. St. 114, 19 Atl. 336 (1890); see HUFFCUTT, AGENCY § 170 (2d
ed. 1901).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. [19521 2 Q.B. at 118.
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American courts hold that mere possession by an agent is not sufficient indicia of ownership to bar recovery by an owner when the
person who appears to be the owner wrongfully transfers the property." Agents representing themselves to be owners of property usually
appear to prospective buyers as factors, dealers or as private individuals selling their own property.
Factors are by definition agents to sell,' but usually they sell
property in their own names." Factor's acts have been passed to protect purchasers, 1 and in these jurisdictions possession. by the factor
bars the principal's recovery against a bona fide purchaser."- Where
such statutes do not exist, the general rule allows the principal's
°
recovery."

Mere possession by a dealer is held to be insufficient indicia of
ownership to pass title to a third person even though he is a bona
fide purchaser." There is some uncertainty, however, as to the sufficiency of possession alone when the dealer is one accustomed to
sell such property in his own name.'
When the agent appears to the third party as an individual selling his own property, as in the instant case, the rights of the parties
8. Calhoun v. Thompson, 56 Ala. 166 (1876); Romeo v. Martucci, 72 Conn.
504, 45 Atl. 1 (1900); Gilman Linseed Oil Co. v. Norton, 89 Iowa 434, 56 N.W.
663 (1893); Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305 (1882); Unger & Co. v. Abbott, 92 Miss.
563, 46 So. 68 (1908); Knox v. Eden Musee American Co., 148 N.Y. 441, 42
N.E. 988 (1896); Smith v. Clews, 114 N.Y. 190, 21 N.E. 160 (1889). see 2 Am.
JUR. Agency § 114 (1936); Note, 57 A.L.R. 393 (1928).
9. See, e.g., Holleman v. Taylor, 200 N.C. 618, 158 S.E. 88 (1931); People's
Bank of Pratt, Kan. v. Frick Co., 13 Okla. 179, 73 Pac. 949 (1903).
10. See, e.g., Gadsden County Tobacco Co. v. Corry, 103 Fla. 217, 137 So. 255
(1931); Commercial Investment Trust v. Stewart, 235 Mich. 502, 209 N.W.
660 (1926); see 2 MEcHEM, AGENCY § 2505 (2d ed. 1914).
11. 2 MEcHEm, AGENCY § 2511 (2d ed. 1914); see statutes cited in 2 WILLISTON,
SALES § 320 (Rev. ed. 1948).
12. 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 322 (Rev. ed. 1948). For discussion of mere possession by factor as notice to purchasers, see 10 FORD. L. REV. 287 (1941).
13. 2 MEcHEM, AGENCY § 2574 (2d ed. 1914); see generally as to factors, Note,
14 A.L.R. 423 (1921).
14. See Gilman Linseed Oil Co. v. Norton, 89 Iowa 434, 56 N.W. 663 (1893);
Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305 (1882); Royle v. Worcester Buick Co., 243 Mass.
143, 137 N.E. 531 (1922); Kelly v. Pelt, 220 S.W. 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); McBrayer v. Smith, 145 S.W. 1053 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). Also see Note, 57
A.L.R. 393 (1928).
15. Some authority holds that entrusting such a dealer with possession bars
recovery of the true owner. See, e.g., Carter v. Rowley, 59 Cal. App. 486, 211
Pac. 267 (1922). See Romeo v. Martucci, 72 Conn. 504, 45 Atl. 99 (1900) (dissenting opinion of case cited, note 8 supra); William Frantz & Co. v. Fink,
125 La. 1013, 52 So. 131 (1910); Fanning v. C.I.T. Corp., 187 Miss. 45, 192 So.
41 (1939); Jones v. Commercial Investment Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac. 896
(1924); Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S.E. 591 (1920).
Other authority holds that a sale to a bona fide purchaser by an agent or
bailee who has been given possession for some other purpose does not bar
recovery by the true owner. Gilman Linseed Oil Co. v. Norton, 89 Iowa 434,
56 N.W. 663 (1893); Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305 (1882); Royle v. Worcester
Buick Co., 243 Mass. 143, 137 N.E. 531 (1922); Utica Trust Deposit Company
v. Decker, 244 N.Y. 340, 155 N.E. 665 (1927); Biggs v. Evans [1894] 1 Q.B. 88;
2 WILLISTON, SALES § 314 (Rev. ed. 1948); 22 ILL. L. REV. 652 (1928); 5 TUL.
L. REV. 670 (1931).
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seem to be clearly embraced by the general rule." For most personal
property there is no means of title recordation, and the buyer of
such property from individual owners does so at his peril or at the
price of considerable investigation. In a business world striving for
greater dommerciability the rule that mere possession is insufficient
indicia of ownership seems to be a doctrine which needs re-evaluation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -ALIENS -DETENTION
IS IMPOSSIBLE

WHERE DEPORTATION

In 1948, relator, a native of Great Britain, sought to enter the United
States for the second time under an American quota visa. He was
excluded by the immigration authorities and denied a hearing. Efforts
were made to deport him to France, the country from whence he sought
entry, and, failing that, to twelve other nations. None of these efforts
was successful, and the petitioner remained in detention on Ellis
Island. The District Court granted his petition for habeas corpus but
imposed certain conditions upon his release 2 Both parties appealed.
Held (2-1), affirmed as to the writ and remanded as to the conditions
imposed. Detention based upon deportation proceedings is an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty when it becomes patent that deportation cannot be effectuated. United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952).
Admission of aliens to this country is not a matter of right but is
discretionary.2 It is subject to the will of Congress, and its administration is under the control of the executive branch." A determination
of exclusion may be made without the benefit of a hearing and without
a disclosure of the reasons therefor.' However, through habeas corpus
proceedings the courts may determine the fairness of the action.'
16. Baehr v. Clark, 83 Iowa 313, 49 N.W. 840 (1891) (almost identical to
instant case); Davidson v. T. L. Farrow Merchantile Co., 13 Ala. App. 614, 68
So. 602 (1915); Unger & Co. v. Abbott, 92 Miss. 563, 46 So. 68 (1908); Stanton
v. Hawley, 193 App. Div. 559, 184 N.Y. Supp. 415 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Dunagan
v. Griffin, 151 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). See also 1 MECHEM, AGENCY
§ 848 (2d ed. 1914).

1. Relator first entered this country in 1923, and remained without becoming
citizen until 1948 at which time he returned to Europe to visit his dying mother.
Under immigration laws each entry is an original entry for the purposes of
determining admission or exclusion. See Alpert, The Alien and the Public
Charge Clauses, 49 YALE L.J. 18, 19 (1939).
2. The relator was not allowed to leave the juridiction of the district court,
and a $5,000 performance bond was imposed.
3. KANSAS, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION, DEPORTATION AND CITIZENSHIP 1

(3d ed. 1948); ROTTSHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 182-83 (1939).
4. See note 3 supra.
5. 8 CODE FED. REGS. § 175.57 (b) (1949); United States ex rel. Knauff v.

Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 Sup. Ct. 309, 94 L. Ed. 317 (1950).

6. 62 STAT. 964 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (1950); United States ex rel. Chu
Leung v. Shaughnessy, 88 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Ex parte Bouiss, 67 F.
Supp. 65 (W.D. Wash. 1946). See ROTTSHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 375
(1939); VAN VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OP ALIENS 149 (1932).
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Though an order of deportation is not considered punishment,' the
protections of the Constitution are ordinarily applicable.' But the
courts have drawn a distinction between exclusion before entry and
deportation subsequent to admission.! In the former case the alien may
not claim constitutional protections since he is not within the borders
of this country; in the latter situation he may do so.'
In the instant case the alien, though having left his ship, has entered
no further than Ellis Island. Since deportation has apparently become
impossible, his detention serves no purpose other than punishment."
If the alien is entitled to the benefit of the Fifth Amendment, the detention is an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.' The few de3
cisions in point indicate that he is so entitled."
The distinction between absolute exclusion and debarkation at Ellis
Island is negligible. Actually it is little more than a matter of convenience for the administration of immigration. Certainly there is a
greater distinction between such an entry and the freedom to travel
at large throughout the country. Consequently there seems to be no
compelling reason for granting the alien constitutional protection
merely by virtue of his debarkation."' The risk attendant upon attempted entry ought to fall upon the alien himself rather than upon
the country where admission is sought.
If the court refuses release the only problem is what to do with the
alien. However, several problems arise when the court holds that
detention must cease when deportation becomes impossible. For ex7. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed.
905 (1893); KANSAS, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION, DEPORTATION AND CITIZENsnip 175 (3d ed. 1948). See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235,
16 Sup. Ct. 977, 41 L. Ed. 140 (1895).
8. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154, 65 Sup. Ct. 1443, 89 L. Ed.
2103 (1945); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16 Sup. Ct. 977,
41 L. Ed. 140 (1895); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064,
30 L. Ed. 220 (1886).
9. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230, 45 Sup. Ct. 257, 69 L. Ed. 585
(1925); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed.
1040 (1905); RoTTsHAEFER,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§§ 182, 183 (1939); VAN

VLECK,

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS 149 (1932).

10. See note 9 supra.
11. 195 F.2d at 967.
12.

ROTTSIIAEFER,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

761 (1939); VAN VLEcK, THE AD-

MINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS 183 (1932).

13. Staniszewski v. Watkins, 80 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States
ex rel. Janavaris v. Nicolls, 47 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1942); Moraitis v. Dalany, 46 F. Supp. 425 (D. Md. 1942); Ex parte Matthews, 277 Fed. 857 (W.D.

Wash. 1921). See Caranica v. Nagle, 28 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1928); United
States ex rel. Ross v. Wallis, 279 Fed. 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1922); United States
ex rel. Chu Leung v. Shaughnessy, 88 F. Supp. 91, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); In re

Krajcirovic, 87 F. Supp. 379, 382 (D. Mass. 1949); United States ex rel. Miskic
v. Uhl, 47 F. Supp. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). But cf. United States ex rel.
Schlimm v. Howe, 222 Fed. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
14. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 45 Sup. Ct. 257, 69 L. Ed. 585 (1925); United
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040 (1905).
15. The fact that the burden of proof rests upon the alien would appear to
bear out this fact. See VAN
101 (1932).

VLECK,

THE

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS
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ample, the length of time during which the deportation must be
effectuated is unsettled."0 Generally four months are allowed. The possibility of the utilization of repeated proceedings to preserve the
validity of continued detention must be considered." Furthermore,
there is a question as to the finality of a release18 as well as to the requirement of regular appearances and of an appearance bond."
In the light of the present world situation perhaps the greatest
problem stems from the threat of possible infiltration of this country
by undesirables. If our power to exclude these aliens is to be limited
by the readiness of foreign nations, who may have interests opposed to
ours, to accept their return, a serious danger exists.
COURTS -

CONTEMPT

-

DELAY IN SUMMARY PUNISHMENT

After nine months of trial, eleven Communist Party leaders were
convicted of violating the Smith Act.' On receiving the verdict, the
trial judge at once filed a certificate under Rule 42 (a)' finding the
defense counsel, petitioners here, guilty of criminal contempt and
sentenced them to prison. The Court of Appeals reversed as to some
specifications but affirmed the conviction and sentences. Certiorari
denied, but upon reconsideration, granted. Held, (5-3), affirmed. Rule
42 allows the trial judge to punish contempt immediately and sum16. Caranica v. Nagle, 28 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1928) (two months); United
States ex rel. Ross v. Wallis, 279 Fed. 401 (2d Cir. 1922) (four months); In re
Krajcirovic, 87 F. Supp. 379 (D. Mass. 1949) (two months); United States ex
rel. Janavaris v. Nicolls, 47 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1942) (one to four months);
Moraitis v. Delany, 46 F. Supp. 425 (D. Md. 1942) (two to four months);
United States ex rel. Schlimm v. Howe, 222 Fed. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (indefinite).
17. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chumura v. Smith, 29 F.2d 287 (W.D.N.Y.
1927).
18. Compare In re Hanoff, 39 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Cal. 1941), where the alien
was seized ten years after his release, with Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238 (D.
Mass. 1925), where the release was final, and with Moraitis v. Delany, 46 F.
Supp. 425 (D. Md. 1942).
19. See note 18 supra.
1. 62STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1951).
2. FED. R. CsIni. P. 42. "(a) Summary Disposition.A criminal contempt may
be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or' heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence
of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed
by the judge and entered of record. (b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing.
A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall
be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing,
allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state
the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe
it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the
presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of
an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show
cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in
any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission
to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect
to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the
trial or hearing except with defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding
of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment."
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marily, if delay will prejudice the trial. But, if he believes the exigencies of the trial require that he defer judgment until its completion, he may do so without extinguishing his power. Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 Sup. Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 437 (1952).
The power of the courts to punish summarily for direct contempts
is ancient.3 It is inherent, "a necessary incident of judicial power,
independent of statutory enactment.... ."' Even the federal courts, having only that jurisdiction expressly given by Congress, have this
implied power, because it is said to be necessary to the exercise of
all others;3 and legislatures are limited in their power to regulate it.'
Trial without notice or hearing, being in direct conflict with our
concept of due process, can be justified only by necessity.7 This
"necessity" is the need to preserve the dignity and authority of the
court by immediate penal vindication;8 it should be considered only
when alternative means appear inadequate.'
Here the trial judge was forced to decide whether to punish the
petitioners at once by summary action, adjudge them guilty of contempt and delay sentence until the conclusion of the trial, or delay
any action until the end of the trial. Had he punished them at once,
it is possible that there would have been no further contemptuous
conduct; or, had he adjudged them guilty of contempt and postponed
sentencing until the end of the trial, the same result might have been
achieved. This, however is mere speculation, and, as the majority
pointed out in the instant case, to find a lawyer guilty of contempt
during the trial would likely prejudice his client." The issue is not
the guilt of the petitioners or the punishment they received but is a
question of procedural regularity as to what tribunal should sit in
judgment, who should mete out the appropriate punishment and
3. 4 Br. CoMnM. *286.
4. Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 344 (1858).
5. See United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L. Ed. 259 (U.S.
1812).
6. ROTTSCHMEFER,

CONSTrruTIONAL LAW

57 (1939).

7. See "Summary punishment of contempt is concededly an exception to
the requirements of Due Process. Necessity dictates the departure. Necessity
must bound its limits." Instant case, 343 U.S. at 36 (dissenting opinion). "Summary punishment for contempt is not a right of the judge, the exercise of which
he may postpone. It is an extraordinary exception to due process of law, justified only by the urgent needs of the moment. When the need for this drastic
action passes, the power so to act also passes. . . ." United States v. Sacher,
182 F.2d 416, 465 (2d Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
8. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275, 68 Sup. Ct. 499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948);
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767 (1925);
United States v. Bollenbach, 125 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1942). See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 422, 38 Sup. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186
(1918) (dissenting opinion by Holmes).
9. "'Necessity' to punish for contempt by summary procedure is a relative
term and is to be interpreted in the light of the reasonable use of the alternative means at hand and a reasonable anticipation of their effect to insure
orderly judicial administration." Harper and Haber, Lawyer Troubles in
PoliticalTrials,60 YALE L.J. 1, 31 (1951).
10. 343 U.S. at 10.
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how the authority of the court should be exercised without detracting
from the authority of the law itself."'
It was argued that because the trial judge, after the contempts had
been committed, waited until the completion of the trial summary
action was no longer necessary. 2 Rule 42 is silent on the subject of
delaying summary punishment; therefore, it would seem that the
Court's prior decisions on the subject would be controlling under the
doctrine of stare decisis." In Ex parte Terry it was held the court
could either punish immediately and summarily, or wait until the
defendant "was arrested on process, brought back into its presence, and
permitted to make defense.""' This decision indicates that delay would
deprive the court of its power to proceed summarily. Yet in 1913, the
Ninth Circuit cited the Terry case as a precedent for the proposition
that a court could delay and still punish summarily;" two recent cases
in the same circuit followed suit." In almost all the other federal
cases on summary punishment for direct contempts the need for
immediate punishment has been the underlying theme."
It was also argued that, since the contemptous conduct of petitioners
was directed at the judge personally, another judge should have been
asked to try the case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in dissent that
the record indicates the conduct of the lawyers had its effect on the
judge. 0 He further said, "Departure from established judicial practice,
which makes it unfitting for a judge who is personally involved to
sit in his own case, was therefore unwarranted. Neither self-respect
nor the good name of the law required it."" It is difficult to see how
giving petitioners a reasonable opportunity to appear and offer a
defense in open court before another judge would have resulted in
any demoralization of the court's dignity and authority.
11. Id. at 25.
12. Id. at 7.
13. The majority in the instant case, however, said that the prior decisions
are of little value as precedents because their facts are so distinguishable.
343 U.S. at 8.

14. "It was within the discretion of that court, whose dignity he had insulted,
and whose authority he had openly defied, to determine whether it should,
upon its own view of what occurred, proceed at once to punish him, or postpone action until he was arrested upon process, brought back into its presence,
and permitted to make defense." 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 Sup. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed.
405 (1888).
15. In re Maury, 205 Fed. 626 (9th Cir. 1913).
16. MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951); Hallinan v.
United States, 191 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950).
17. "[Tlhe need for immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the
court created it." Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 390,
69 L. Ed. 767 (1925). "[T]here should be no delay, upon the part of the court,
in exerting its power to punish." Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 311, 9 Sup. Ct,
77, 32 L. Ed. 405, (1888). "[Hie must be able to repress disorders quickly and,
if necessary, ruthlessly ...." United States v. Bollenbach, 125 F.2d 458, 460
(2d Cir. 1942).
18. 343 U.S. at 7.
19. Id. at 34.
20. Id. at 36.
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The constitutional safeguards of due process and of trial by jury
should be offered an accused wherever that is possible. In the instant
case it was possible. Perhaps, because of the extraordinary facts of
this case, the rule of law laid down will be rigidly restricted to similar
fact situations.

CRIMINAL LAW-HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTESMEANING OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION REQUIREMENT
Petitioner was tried in 1943 for a felony under an indictment which
set forth the existence of two prior convictions and sentences imposed
upon him in 1933. He was convicted and given a life sentence under
the habitual criminal statute.' In a habeas corpus proceeding against
the warden of the West Virginia penitentiary, he sought to obtain a
release from custody on the ground that the 1933 convictions were
imposed on successive days and hence did not satisfy the statutory
provision, "have been twice before convicted," since he had not served
the first sentence when the second was imposed. The trial court
granted the petition. Held, reversed. Each conviction under the statute
must be for an offense committed subsequent to the prior conviction.
However, the petitioner is remanded to the custody of the warden
in order that he may serve the remaining valid portion of the 1943
sentence. Dye v. Skeen, 62 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 1950).
At least forty-three states have enacted some form of an habitual
criminal statute.2 There appear to be two main purposes underlying
them, namely to serve as a warning to first offenders and to afford a
1. W. Va. Acts. 1939, c. 26, §§ 18, 19.
2. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 331 (1940); Aniz. CODE ANN. § 43-6111 (1939);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 644 (1949); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §§ 555(1)-555(3)
(Supp. 1951); CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 8820 (Supp. 1949); D. C. CODE §§
22-104 (1940); FLA. STAT. §§ 775, 775.09, 775.10 (1949); GA. CODE § 272511 (1933); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2414 (1932); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38,
§ 602 (1949); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2343 (Baldwin 1934); IOWA CODE § 747.1
(1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-107a (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.190 (1948);
LA. CODE CRnVi. LAW & PROC. ANN. § 709.1 (Dart 1943); ME. REV. STAT. c. 136,
§ 3 (1944); MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 279, § 25 (1932); MIcH. Comp. LAWS §§ 7691076913 (1948); MIfNI. STAT. ANN. §§ 610.28, 610.29 (West 1945); Mo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 556.290 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4713 (1947); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2221 (1943); NEV. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 9976 (1929); N.H. REV. LAWS
c. 460, § 1 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:103-10 (Supp. 1937); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42-1601, 42-1603 (1941); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1942; N.Y. CON. LAWS ANN.
art. 90, § 1020 (Baldwin 1938); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 12-0618, 12-0619 (1943);
OMO CODE ANN. §§ 4130, 13457-2 (Baldwin 1940); OKA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 51, 52
(1951); ORE. Com. LAWS ANN. § 26-2803 (1940), as amended; PUB. LAWS ORE.
c. 585 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5108 (1945); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 625 § 64
(1938); S.D. CODE § 13.0611 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 118631, 118632 (Williams Supp. 1947); TEx. STAT. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 63, 64 (1936); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 103-1-18 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-268, 20-46, 53-296 (1950); VT.
STAT. ANN. § 2286 (1932); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6130 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 359.02 (1949), also WIs. ANN. §§ 359.02, 359.

PUB. LAWS § 8751 (1933); WASH. REV.

17 (1950); Wyo. CovB. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-109, 9-110 (1945).
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convict an opportunity to reform.' The typical enactment provides
for the imposition of an additional sentence for the second conviction.' Others provide for the additional sentence on the third, fourth
or fifth offenses, and a few provide for intermediate convictions on a
graduated scale plan, until a maximum is reached at which time a life
term or death sentence is imposed.'
The instant case involves a question that has caused concern in interpreting such statutes, namely, the meaning of the words "previously
convicted."' The overwhelming majority of the courts, in construing
these words, hold that for purposes of satisfying the statute a person
has not been "previously convicted" unless he has not only been
charged and convicted for a previous crime, but also has served the
sentence imposed. In so construing these words they declare that the
legislative intention is to give the previously convicted a chance to
reform under threat of a more severe penalty if he again offends
society." Under this view, the criminal who is successful in evading
the police for years and has perpetrated crimes ad infinitum, is not
when apprehended for the first time a habitual criminal under the
3. See, e.g., Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So.2d 304 (1947); Cobb v.
Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 176, 101 S.W.2d 418 (1936); State v. Hamilton, 340
Mo. 768, 102 S.W.2d 642 (1937); People v. Spellman, 136 Misc. 25, 242 N.Y.
Supp. 68 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Commonwealth v. Calio, 155 Pa. Super. 355, 38 A.2d
351 (1944); Gammill v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. R. 52, 117 S.W.2d 790 (1938); State
v. Jones, 138 Wash. 110, 244 Pac. 395 (1926). See also 51 HARV. L. REV. 345
(1937).
4. E.g., ARIz. CODE ANN.§ 43-6111 (1939); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2343 (Baldwin
1934); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.190 (1948); ME. REV. STAT. c. 136, § 3 (1944);
MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 769.10 (1948); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-1601 (1941); OicA.
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 51, 52 (1951); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 625, § 64 (1938); Wis. STAT.
§ 359.12 (1949).
5. For a general view of this type see IND. STAT. ANN. § 2343 (Baldwin 1934)
(third conviction); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11863.1, 11863.2 (Williams Supp. 1947)
(fourth conviction); NEV. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 9976 (1929) (fifth conviction). The preceeding are mandatory provisions. Other examples where the
maximum sentence is discretionary are ME. REV. STAT. c. 136, § 3 (1944)
(second conviction); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 602 (1949) (third conviction);
S.D. CODE § 13.0611 (1939) (fourth conviction). Not all the statutes, however,
provide for a life 'or death sentence, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 331 (1940);
CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 8820 (Supp. 1949); D.C. CODE § 22-104 (1940); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2511 (1933); IOWA CODE § 747.1 (1950); MAss. GEN. LAWS C.
279, § 25 (1932); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (1943); N.H. REV. LAWS c. 460,
§ 1 (1942); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 625, § 64 (1938); WIS. STAT. § 359.12 (1949).
See also Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COL. L. REV.
238 (1948) (an excellent discussion and classification of the various statutes).
6. E.g., People v. Braswell, 103 Cal. App. 399, 284 Pac. 709 (1930); People v. Dawson, 210 Cal. 366, 292 Pac. 267 (1930); Cobb v. Commonwealth
267 Ky. 176, 101 S.W.2d 418 (1936); People v. Lowenstein, 309 Mich. 94, 4
N.W.2d 794 (1944); People v. Spellman, 136 Misc. 25, 242 N.Y. Supp. 68
(Sup. Ct. 1930); Commonwealth v. Sutton, 125 Pa. Super. 406, 189 Atl. 556
(1937); Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514 (1950).
7. See People v. Dawson, 210 Cal. 366, 292 Pac. 267 (1930); Cobb v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 176, 101 S.W.2d 418 (1936); Taylor v. State, 114 Neb. 257, 207
N.W. 207 (1926); Arbuckle v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. R. 371, 105 S.W.2d 219

(1937). See also Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COL.

L. REV. 238, 244 (1948).
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statute.8 Whereas, it is possible for one who commits a minimum of
two crimes to become so labeled and "suffer the added penalty which
can range up to a life sentence if he has been convicted and sentenced
on the first charge.! These are admittedly extreme examples, yet they
are real possibilities.
The minority view is to interpret these words to mean the conviction for a crime committed, disregarding whether or not the sentence
imposed has been served."° Under this interpretation, the courts believe
that by looking at a man's crimes regardless of when committed, his
habits can be revealed, and, if criminal, he can at once be removed
from society." The majority view seems to favor the reform of the
criminal, while the other view gives more weight to the immediate protection of society. The question as to which view is more beneficial to
society has been thoroughly discussed by various authors in the field,
who seemingly can only agree that revision of the existing statutes is
sorely needed. The West Virginia court in this instance has interpretated its statute
in accordance with the overwhelming majority view. To do otherwise,
would have necessitated the reversal of earlier West Virginia precedent."
8. An interesting example is the case of Willie Sutton in Commonwealth v.

Sutton, 125 Pa. Super. 407, 189 Atl. 556 (1937). Also, "In Ohio, under the
decision in State v. Sudekatus [72 Ohio App. 165, 51 N.E.2d 22 (6th Dist. 1943)]
an habitual offender committing repeated grand larcenies immediately on
his release after serving minimum sentences under the larceny law [OHIo CODE
ANN. § 12447 (1940) ] and the habitual criminal law [id. §§ 13744-1 to-3] would
require nine years to build up a record to entitle him to life imprisonment.
For a professional burglar, it would take forty years, and the statute may not
reach him with full effect till 1969. Id. § 12437." 48 COL. L. REV. 238, 244 n.51
(1948).
9. Such is possible under "second conviction" statutes. E.g., ME. REV. STAT.
c. 136, § 3 (1944); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 51, 52 (1951).
10. People v. Braswell, 103 Cal. App. 399, 284 Pac. 709 (1930); State v. Fry,
131 Kan. 777, 291 Pac. 782 (1930); Bumbaugh v. State, 36 Ohio. App. 375,
173 N.E. 267 (1930); People v. Lowenstein, 309 Mich. 94, 14 N.W.2d 794 (1944)
(possible under this holding); Waxler v. State, 68 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514
(1950). But see People v. Dawson, 210 Cal. 366, 292 Pac. 267, 270 (1930), which
confuses the California decisions. The California Supreme Court, by employing
the opposite theory of that used in People v. Braswell, 103 Cal. App. 399, 284
Pac. 709 (1930), decided eight months earlier, leaves the California courts
in a position to choose between theories.
11. See cases cited note 9 supra.
12. For those interested in approaching the problem from a scientific, yet
practical standpoint, see ELLIOTT, CONFLICTING PENAL THEORIES IN STATUTORY
CRIMNAL LAW c. II, X, XIII (1931); GLUECK AND GLUECK, AFTER CONDUCT OF
DISCHARGED OFFENDERS C. VI, VIII (1945); Monachesi, American Studies in
the Prediction of Recidivism, 41 Joum. Canm. L. 268 (1950). Other excellent
works appear in Brown, The Treatment of the Recidivist in the U.S., 23 CAN.
B. REV. 630 (1945); McCurig, Modern Tendencies in Habitual Criminal Legislation, 15 CORNELL L. Q. 62 (1929); Note, 57 YALE. L.J. 1085 (1948). For those
less interested in a scientific approach see, GAROFALO, CRnvNOLOGY (Millar
transl. 1914). See especially the outline of principles suggested as a basis for
an international penal code, §§ 15, 16. Id. at 409.
13. See Stover v. Riffe, 128 W. Va. 70, 35 S.E.2d 689 (1945).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - LIABILITY OF HUSBAND FOR NECESSARIES
OF WIFE RIGHTFULLY LIVING APART
A wife, who was compelled to leave her husband because of his
cruelty, borrowed money from the plaintiff to purchase necessaries.
Plaintiff sued the husband for payment of the money lent on the theory
that the wife was the husband's agent by necessity. The lower court
denied the plaintiff recovery because the wife had assets of her own
which she could have used to pay for her necessaries. Held, plaintiff's
appeal dismissed. The wife, having means to support herself, was not
the husband's agent by necessity. Biberfeld v. Berens [1952] 2 All E.
R. 237 (C.A.).
At common law a husband had the duty to support his wife and
family.' This duty still exists; it is said to be imposed by law and to
arise out of the marriage itself.2 It is based on considerations of public
policy and cannot be evaded by contract.' If the husband fails to
support his wife she may pledge his credit for her necessaries.' Some
jurisdictions take the view that the husband's liability for his wife's
necessaries is but another application of his primary duty to her arising out of the marriage. Other authorities predicate the husband's
liability on the theory of implied agency.' This type of agency is
commonly referred to as "agency of necessity," which simply means
that there is an implied agency existing when the wife is forced to
purchase articles for her needs on her husband's credit." Accurately
speaking this type of "agency" is not referable to the law of agency'
as it can be imposed upon the husband against his will.' Regardless
of the reasons given by the courts for establishing liability in these
1. See Traux v. Ellett, 234 Iowa 1217, 15 N.W.2d 361, 362 (1944); Broaddus

v. Broaddus, 221 S.W. 804, 806 (Mo. App. 1920); Rich v. Rich, 12 N.J. Misc.
310, 171 AtI. 515, 517-18 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1934); In re Garrison, 171 Misc.
983, 14 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (Co. Ct. 1939); In re McGinnis' Estate, 109 Pa. Super.
248, 167 Ati 616, 617 (1933).
2. See Kelley v. Kelley, 244 Ala. 465, 14 So.2d 371 (1943); Remondino v.
Remondino, 41 Cal. App.2d 208, 106 P.2d 437, 441 (1940); Wallace v. Wallace,
61 Ga. App. 789, 7 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1940); Kearney v. Kearney, 178 Miss. 766,
174 So. 59, 60 (1937); Levy v. Levy, 17 N.J. Misc. 324, 9 A.2d 779, 781 (Ch.
1939); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 163 Misc. 98, 297 N.Y. Supp. 642, 644 (Dom. Rel, Ct.
1937).
3. See In re Ryan's Estate, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N.W. 820, 15 L.R.A. (N.s.) 491
(1908); In re Simonson's Estate, 164 Wis. 590, 160 N.W. 1040, 1042 (1917).
4. See Stokes v. Dollard, 94 Colo. 206, 29 P.2d 706, 707 (1934); Pfenninger
v. Brevard, 129 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Mo. App. 1939); Reynolds v. Rice, 224 Mo.
App. 972, 27 S.W.2d 1059, 1060 (1930); Asche v. Wakeley, 112 N.J. Eq. 60,
163 Atl. 278 (Ch. 1932); Gruenberg v. Douglas, 118 N.J.L. 398, 193 Atl. 176,
177 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
5. See Kelley v. Kelley, 244 Ala. 465, 14 So.2d 371 (1943); Wallace v. Wallace,
61 Ga. App. 789, 7 S.E.2d 604, 605 (1940).
6. See Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77, 78 (1891); see 1 MECHEM,
AGENCY § 161 (2d ed. 1914).
7. See MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoiESTic RELATIONS 190 (1931).
8. See Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77, 78, (1891); see Brown, The

Duty of the Husband to Support the Wife, 18 VA. L. REV. 823, 827 (1932).
9. See note 8 supra.
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cases, the real basis for holding the husband liable seems to be his
duty to support his wife according to his means."
The husband's liability in such cases is not without qualification. He
will not be liable for necessaries of his wife if he makes adequate
provision for her." In the absence of the wife's actual necessity, the
husband can only be made liable through an express agency. If the
wife leaves the husband without justifiable cause she forfeits the
right to obtain her necessaries at his expense. 3 The term "necessaries"
in its legal sense is not restricted to food and clothing but includes
any article that is suitable to maintain the wife according to her
station in life and her husband's means."' The husband is liable for
the wife's funeral expensee' and Married Women's Acts do not
relieve the husband of this liability." It is generally said that if the
necessaries were given to the wife on her own credit and not on the
credit of her husband, he will not be liable for them."
In the instant case the court applied the rule previously laid down
10. Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77 (1891).
11. Benjamin v. Benjamin, 15 Conn. 347 (1843); Steinfield v. Girrard, 103
Me. 151, 68 Atl. 630 (1907); Weingreen v. Beckton, 102 N.Y. Supp. 520 (Sup. Ct.
1907); Wanahnaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135 (1903). Contra: Hill
v. Comm'r, 88 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1937); see Corbett v. Wade, 124 S.W.2d 889, 891
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
12. See McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stern Co., 137 Md. 573, 113 Atl. 107, 109, 18
A.L.R. 1125 (1921); Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77, 78 (1891).
13. Johnson v. Coleman, 13 Ala. App. 520, 69 So. 318 (1915); Steinfield v.
Girrard, 103 Me. 151, 68 AtI. 630 (1907); Gimbel Bros. v. Adams, 178 Wis. 590,
190 N.W. 357 (1922); see Pfenninger v. Brevard, 129 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Mo.
App. 1939); Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704, 706 (1921); cf.
Kessler v. Kessler, 2 Cal. App. 509, 83 Pac. 257 (1905) (statute relieving husband of the duty to support his wife where she leaves him without justifiable
cause); Brown v. Durepo, 121 Me. 226, 116 Atl. 451, 27 A.L.R. 551 (1922).
14. Cooper v. Haseltine, 50 Ind. App. 400, 98 N.E. 437 (1912) (jewelry was
held to be a necessary); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245, 136 N.E.
350, 24 A.L.R. 1480 (1922) (furniture); Schneider v. Rosebaum, 52 Misc. 143,
101 N.Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (services of a nurse); Clark v. Tenneson,
146 Wis. 65, 130 N.W. 895, 33 L.R.A. (N.s.) 426 (1911) (false teeth).
15. Ketterer v. Nelson, 146 Ky. 7, 141 S.W. 409, 37 L.R.A. (N.s.) 754 (1911);
Anderson v. Carter, 175 Md. 540, 2 A.2d 677 (1938); Stone v. Tyack, 164 Mich.
550, 129 N.W. 694, (1911); In re Waesch's Estate, 166 Pa. 204, 30 Atl. 1124
(1895); Simpson v. Drake, 150 Tenn. 84, 262 S.W. 41 (1924); see Reynolds v.
Rice, 224 Mo. App. 972, 27 S.W.2d 1059, 1060 (1930). But cf. In re Kefover's
Estate, 112 Colo. 53, 145 P.2d 879 (1944); In re Johnson's Estate, 198 S.C. 526,
18 S.E.2d 450 (1942); Edwards v. Cuthbert, 184 Va. 502, 36 S.E.2d 1 (1945).
16. Ponder v. D.W. Morris & Bros., 152 Ala. 531, 44 So. 651 (1907); Dubow v.
Gottinello, 111 Conn. 306, 149 Atl. 768 (1930); Reynolds v. Rice, 224 Mo. App.
972, 27 S.W.2d 1059 (1930); Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265

(1915).

17. Gafford v. Dunham, 111 Ala. 551, 20 So. 346 (1896); Noel v. O'Neill,
128 Md. 202, 97 Atl. 513 (1916); Byrnes v. Rayner, 84 Hun 199, 32 N.Y. Supp.
542 (Sup. Ct. 1895); Tille v. Finley, 126 Ohio St. 578, 186 N.E. 448 (1933);
see Brown v. Durepo, 121 Me. 226, 116 Atl. 451, 452, 27 A.L.R. 551 (1922); Fulcomer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 141 Pa. Super. 264, 14 A.2d 593, 597 (1940). Contra:
Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92 Pac. 842 (1907). The burden of proving
the husband's liability is on the creditor who bears the risk of recovering
from him. He must prove that the articles he furnished were necessaries, that
the husband failed to provide for his wife and that the wife is justified in
living apart from her husband. See Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W.
77, 78 (1891). On burden of proof in general see 26 Am. JuR., Husband and Wife
§ 372 (1940); MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS 190 (1931).
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in England that if the wife is able to support herself, either through
her ability to earn or her separate estate or income, the husband will
not be liable for necessaries. 8 American courts, with a few exceptions,
have taken a contrary position. It is well settled in this country that
the husband will be liable for his wife's necessaries when he forces
her to live apart from him and fails to provide for her support, regardless of her separate estate or ability to earn." A few American
courts have adopted the English view and have absolved the husband
from liability where it can be proved that the wife has a separate
means of support.0
The English rule is based on the idea that an "agency of necessity"
presupposes an actual necessity.2 ' It is argued by the advocates of this

view that it would be highly inequitable for the husband to be charged
with the articles furnished the wife when she might have a separate
estate or income of a far greater amount than his. -" Nevertheless, the
American courts refuse to accept this reasoning and persist in stating
that the duty of the husband to furnish the wife with means of
obtaining her necessaries is not to be affected by the wife's separate
estate or income.
INCOME TAXATION - EXCLUDIBILITY FROM GROSS INCOME OF
PAYMENT OVER CEILING PRICE
The taxpayer, a Maryland corporation, was engaged in buying and
selling automobiles for which were paid prices in excess of the ceilings
officially determined under the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942.1 It computed its gross income by subtracting from gross receipts
the actual prices paid for the cars. A deficiency assessment was determined by the Commissioner who limited the exclusion to the
authorized ceiling prices. The taxpayer paid the tax and brought this
action in the District Court to recover the alleged deficiency. Held,
18. Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 86, 171 Eng. Rep. 581 (N.P. 1817); cf. In re
Wood's Estate, 1 De G. J. & S. 465, 46 Eng. Rep. 185 (Ch. 1863); Johnston v.
Sumner, 3 H. & N. 261, 157 Eng. Rep. 469 (Ex. 1858).

19. McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stern Co., 137 Md. 573, 113 Atl. 107, 18 A.L.R.

1125 (1921); Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H. 231, 47 Atl. 80, 51 L.R.A. 226 (1900); Moore
v. Copeley, 165 Pa. 294, 30 Atl. 829 (1895); Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425,
107 S.E. 704 (1921); cf. H. G. Goelitz Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 278 Ill.
164, 115 N.E. 855 (1917); American Mill Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois,
279 II. 560, 117 N.E. 147 (1917); see Reynolds v. Rice, 224 Mo. App. 972, 27
S.W.2d 1059, 1060 (1930); Boldwin v. Fowler, 217 S.W. 637, 638 (Mo. App.
1920).
20. Litson v. Brown, 26 Ind. 489 (1866); Hunt v. Hayes, 64 Vt. 89, 23 Atl.
920, 15 L.R.A. 661 (1892); cf. Eiler v. Crull, 99 Ind. 375 (1884); Prescott v.
Webster, 175 Mass. 316, 56 N.E. 577 (1900). See 22 CORNEtL L.Q. 266 (1937),

for a discussion of how New York's various domestic relation laws have affected the husband's liability for his wife's necessaries.
21. See Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 86, 171 Eng. Rep. 581, 582 (N.P. 1817).
22. See Johnston v. Sumner, 3 H. & N. 261, 157 Eng. Rep. 469, 472 (E:. 1858).
1. 56 STAT. 23 (1942).
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the entire cost of the automobiles was properly subtracted from gross
receipts in determining gross income. Anderson Oldsmobile, Inc. v.
Hofferbert, 102 F. Supp. 902 (D. Md. 1952).
Originally, the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled' that payments in
excess of ceiling prices set by the O.P.A. were not allowable in computing the gross income, since public policy decreed that no tax
advantage should be derived from such illegal expenditures. The Tax
Court rejected this in Sullenger v. Comm'r,3 and held that the taxpayer was entitled to have such excess treated as part of the cost of
goods sold in computing income from the sale thereof. The courts have
followed the Sullenger case insofar as it holds that there is no constitutional authority for taxing gross receipts.' The Sixteenth Amendment' gave Congress power to tax only income and not capital.' Unless
the taxpayer is allowed to recover his capital cost from gross receipts,
he is being taxed on the basis of receipts rather than income."
2. See discussion and criticism of the Bureau's ruling I.T. 3724, 1945 Cum.
BULL. 57, in Krekstein, Deductibility of Over-Ceiling Payments in SIXTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 703, 705-10 (1948), to the effect that
the six cases cited in that ruling in support of the conclusion are concerned
with deductions under INT. REV. CODE § 23, and are authority only that the
payments made in contravention of public policy may not be deducted from
gross income in determining net income.
3. 11 TC 1076 (1948), af'd without opinion, 4 P-H 1950 FED. TAX SERV.
II 71,055 (5th Cir. 1950); followed in Herman Baum, P-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC.
[ 51,082; Ethel L. Couch, P-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC. ff 51,054; Carl H. Conner,
P-H 1951 TC Mum. DEC. f 51,320; Bruce E. Gentry, P-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC.
fr 51,034; Winnifred Guminski, P-H 1951 TC MEm. DEC. 1 51,051; Clara Eugenia
Piper, P-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC. ff 51,055; Sol Smith, P-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC.
1 51,315; Benjamin Weisman, P-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC. 1 51,139, aff'd sub nom.
Comm'r v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952). The last mentioned case is
the most recent affirmation of the principle in the instant case.
4. Compare Anderson Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Hofferbert, 122 F. Supp. 902, 907
(D. Md. 1952) (refusal to exclude the illegal portion of cost of goods sold
would violate "due process" of the 5th Amendment), and Herber v. Jones,
103 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Okla. 1951) (refusal to exclude this illegal portion of
cost of goods sold would violate the 16th Amendment as being tax on gross
receipts rather than on gross income), with United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S.
259, 47 Sup. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037 (1927) (held, not a violation of 5th
Amendment to tax income, gains and profits of illegal business), and Comm'r
v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion) ("It seems
to me clear that Congress would have constitutional power to impose such a
sanction [i.e., tax on illegal gross receipts] ... whether or not Congress would
have power to impose a general tax on gross receipts. .. ") Although the
principal case and the Weisman case disagree on the constitutional issue involved, they do agree that Congress has imposed no sanction to taxing gross
receipts of those who paid more than the ceiling prices. Instant case at 906-7;
Comm'r v. Weisman, supra at 222-26. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-5
(1943) (gross income from business means "the total sales less the cost of
goods sold").
5. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CoNsT.
AMEND. XVI.
6. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521 (1920);
Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 62 L. Ed. 1054
(1918) (cost of goods is capital and as such must be restored to the seller
before a sale can produce taxable income); 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 5.06. (1942).
7. Herber v. Jones, 103 F. Supp. 210, 214 (W.D. Okla. 1951).
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A distinction is drawn between subtracting illegal sums from gross
receipts in determining gross income under Section 22(a) and deducting such sums from gross income under Section 23.' In the latter
situation the courts have noted the sharply defined policies of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942' and considered whether its
policies would be frustrated by allowing these deductions.1 Where the
violation was innocent and unintentional, allowing a deduction does
not frustrate the policies of the price control law.11 But where the
violation results in a criminal prosecution and a fine is assessed, to
allow a deduction under Section 23 of that fine would mitigate its
penal nature and hence frustrate the policy of the statute imposing
it." The courts have also held that losses arising out of unlawful business operations in contravention of regulatory statutes are not deductible as "ordinary and necessary" expenses."
Why have the courts consistently disallowed illegal sums as business deductions on the basis of public policy, and just as consistently
allowed them as exclusions in determining gross income? The basis for
including these illegal expenditures in the cost of goods sold is that
8. See Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323, 324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 704 (1937); Sullenger v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 1076, 1077 (1948); Lawrence
Sternkopf, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEC. f 50,062; Harold E. McCullough, P-H 1949
TC MEm. DEC. f 49,175. Krekstein, Deductibility of Overceiling Payments in

SixTH ANNUAL

INSTITUTE ON FEDERaL TAXATION

703, 706 (1948).

9. The Emergency Price Control Act, 56 STAT. 23 (1942), was amended by
the Stabilization Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 765, 767, to the effect that, "The President shall also prescribe the extent to which any .

.

. payment made in con-

travention of such regulations shall be disregarded by... government agencies
in determining the costs or expenses of any employer for the purposes of any
other law or regulation." See also, Exec. Order No. 9250, discussed in instant
case at 907. The latest legislation is the Defense Production Act of 1950, 64
STAT. 80, as amended, 65 STAT. 136, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2105 (1951) (authority
given to the President to authorize, by Executive Order, government agencies
to disregard payments of overceiling prices; but no such Executive Order
has been executed). None of the above alter the original act as to the issues
involved in the present ease.
10. Lilly v. Comm'r, 343 U.S. 90, 72 Sup. Ct. 497, 96 L. Ed. 385 (1952); Comm'r
v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 64 Sup. Ct. 249, 88 L. Ed. 171 (1943) (narrowing
the generally accepted meaning of § 23(a) in order that tax deduction
consequences might not frustrate sharply defined national or state policies).
See also Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 561 (1950).
11. Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949), 3 VAND.
L. REv. 323 (1950); Pacific Mills v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 705 (1951). See also note
9 supra.
12. Compare cases cited note 10 supra, with I.T. 3627, 1943 Cum. BULL. 111,

and I.T. 3630, 1943 Cum. BuLL. 113 which denied deduction of fines paid the
government for violation of O.P.A. regulation as frustration of the policy of
the statute. See Comm'r v. Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); United States v. Jaffray, 97 F.2d 488, 494 (8th
Cir. 1938), ajFd sub nom. United States v. Bertelsen & Peterson Engineering
Co., 306 U.S. 276, 59 Sup. Ct. 541, 83 L. Ed. 647 (1939); Gelfand, Payments to
O.P.A., 27 TAxEs 961 (1949); 20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 796 (1952).
13. Wagner v. Comm'r, 30 B.T.A. 1099 (1934) (neither "ordinary and necessary" business expenses nor business losses deductible if incurred in the
commission of act forbidden by statute).
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to refuse to do so would amount to taxing capital.' On the other hand,
it is clear that Congress possesses a broad power to limit or deny
deductions from gross income in determining net income." The
courts have interpreted Section 23 so that it will not violate the basic
policies of other statutes involved."
In the instant case the court approved the approach of the Tax
Court in the Sullenger case. This result seems sound, and the holding
probably will be followed wherever an illegal sum is involved in
determining gross income from the gross receipts.

INCOME TAXATION -TAXABLE

INCOME - CLAIM OF RIGHT

From 1929 to 1933, defendant was associated with others in a bootlegging operation, known as the "High Seas Venture." Contributing
no capital, he shared in the profits because of his associates' fear that
they might otherwise have "trouble and interference." In 1933, when
Prohibition came to an end, defendant's associates organized an honest
liquor business. In order to exclude defendant, they paid him $60,000
in exchange for the assignment of his interests, if any, in the new
enterprise. Thereafter, however, he continued to demand his share
of the profits, and over a period of years he was paid more than
$750,000 as a result of threats that he would kill members of the family
of the chief stockholder. Having failed to include some $250,000 of
14. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521 (1920);
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 468, 62 L. Ed. 1954 (1918);

Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 704 (1937).
15. Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co., 292 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct.
758, 78 L. Ed. 1311 (1934); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,
440, 54 Sup. Ct. 788, 78 L. Ed. 1348 (1934) ('Whether and to what extent
deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as there
is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed."); Van
Vleck v. Comm'r, 80 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1935); Gillette v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 6
(2d Cir. 1935); see Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323, 325 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 301 U.S. 704 (1937) (deduction may be allowed or not in sound discretion of Congress as a matter of grace); BURTON, CASES ON FEDERAL TAXATION
148 (3d ed. 1950); 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 150-51 (1942) (deductions are only a matter of legislative grace and not a matter of right);

Note, Taxability of Gross Income Under the Sixteenth Amendment, 36 COL.

L. REV. 274 (1936).
16. Although the results as to deductibility of a fine have varied with the

facts in the cases, the rationale of the courts has been to allow a deduction

from gross income only when it does not violate the basic policy of the
statute. E.g., Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 711, (2d Cir. 1949);

Comm'r v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Comm'r, 47 F.2d 990 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931); Burroughs Building Material Co. v.
Comm'r, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931). Among the many cases of Tax Court denying deductibility of penal fine, see Pacific Mills v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 705 (1951);
Universal Atlas Cement Co. v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 971 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 171
F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948); Garibaldi & Cuneo v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 446 (1947). In
I.T. 3627, 1943 Cum. BULL. 111 and I.T. 3630, 1943 CUm. 'BULL. 113, in which the
Treasury Department recognized the policies of the statutes as controlling and
would not allow a fine paid to the government as a "ordinary and necessary"
business expense deductible from gross income.
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this money in his gross income for 1943, defendant was indicted and
convicted of tax evasion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held (5-4), affirmed. Money obtained
by extortion is distinguishable from stolen money and is gross income.
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 72 Sup. Ct. 571, 96 L. Ed. 485
(1951).
The Federal Government bases taxation of income on an annual accounting period which is invoked in order to facilitate administration
of the income tax law.2 Although this system simplifies administration, it can cause hardship to a taxpayer whose transactions do not
conform to definite tax periods or who acquires possession of funds
which may have to be returned in subsequent tax periods. Recipients
of such unsettled income contended that items which ordinarily would
be gross income' were not taxable, either because of their contingency
or because of their subsequent restitution. The courts, however, have
consistently held that any such item of income received under a claim
of right is taxable in the year received, even though that right is defective and a court of equity might order the money returned in a
later year.' In a variety of cases involving money the taxpayer received and treated as his own' a claim of right was found, even where
the money was the proceeds of an illegal activity.'
The term "claim of right" denotes whether or not a taxable gain
has been acquired. The presence or absence of a claim of right de1.

INT. REV. CODE § 41.

2. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150, 75 L. Ed.
383 (1931).
3. INT. REV. CODE § 22(a) broadly defines "gross income" in part as "gains,
profits and income... derived from any source whatever." Judicial definition
has likewise been broad. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40
Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521 (1920) ("gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined").
4. See North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424, 52 Sup.
Ct. 613, 76 L. Ed. 1197 (1932). Prior to the North American case, the general
rule had been that money which met the broad test of "gross income" was
taxable in the year received by the taxpayer. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks
Co., 282 U.S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150, 78 L. Ed. 382 (1931); Lucas v. American Code
Co., 280 U.S. 445, 50 Sup. Ct. 202, 74 L. Ed. 538 (1930). However, the Board of
Tax Appeals had favored refunds of taxes upon restitution on the theory that
the gains had never been gross income in the first place. Lilly v. Comm'r, 14
B.T.A. 703 (1928).
5. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 54 Sup. Ct. 376, 78 L. Ed. 725 (1934);
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Higgins, 157 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1946); Jacobs v. Hoey,
136 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1943); Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940);
First National Bank v. Comm'r, 107 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1939); Saunders v.
Comm'r, 101 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1939); Griffin v. Smith, 101 F.2d 348 (7th Cir.
1938); National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938); McDuffie v.
United States, 19 F. Supp. 239 (Ct. Cl. 1937).
6. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 Sup. Ct. 549, 87 L. Ed.
704 (1943); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 Sup. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed.
1037, 51 A.L.R. 1020 (1927); Humphreys v. Comm'r, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.

1942); Chadick v. United States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1935); United States v.
Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. Wampler, 5 F. Supp.
796 (D. Md. 1934); Droge v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937); Rickard v. Comm r,
15 B.T.A. 316 (1929); James P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A. 326 (1925); Petit v. Comm'r,
10 T.C. 1253 (1948).
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pends upon whether the transaction is void at law or voidable in
equity.' Borrowed money is not income;8 likewise, embezzled or stolen
money is not income,' for the thief gets no title."° On the other hand,
money obtained by false pretenses is held under a claim of right," as
is money taken from, or paid over by, an owner with full knowledge
of a fraud or wrong.' 2
In the instant case, the court distinguished defendant's extortion
from embezzlement' and compared it to fraud," thus preserving the
distinction between void and voidable transactions. The decision,
therefore, is but a reaffirmation' of the claim of right doctrine and
the application of traditional principles of property law in determining
7. Akers v. Scofield, 167 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948).
In Penn. v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940), dividends were held taxable although the stock allotment plan under which they had been paid was
declared "void ab initio." Parker, J., said: "In my view, the stock transaction

was not absolutely void but voidable.... If, however, I were of the opinion that
the stock transaction was absolutely void, ab initio, and not merely voidable,
I would think that no taxable income resulted from the entry of the credit for
dividends on the note of Penn. If the stock transfer was void, the credit of the
dividends was likewise void. No taxable income could possibly result from
void entries of credit on a void note." Id. at 177 (concurring opinion).
8. Wells v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1946). Borrowed money,
however, may later become income if the debtor-creditor relationship is
extinguished. Comm'r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 69 Sup. Ct. 358, 93 L. Ed. 477
(1949) (release given in exchange for less than the full debt); Securities Co.
v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (suit barred by statute of
limitations).
9. Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 66 Sup. Ct. 546, 90 L. Ed. 752, 166 A.L.R.
884 (1946); Estate of Joseph Nitto v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 858 (1949).
10. Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 66 Sup. Ct. 546, 90 L. Ed. 752, 166 A.L.R.
884 (1946).
11. See Akers v. Scofield, 167 F.2d 718, 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.

823 (1948).

12. Distinguishing embezzlement from swindling, the Tax Court said, referring to the Wilcox case: "In that case, unlike here, the funds were misappropriated without the knowledge or participation of the owner and, also,
the funds came to the party who was sought to be taxed, not by the 'conscious
act' of the owner in response to a claim for an agreed service by the party to
whom they were paid." Estate of Joseph Nitto v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 858, 866
(1949).
13. "The issue here is whether money extorted from a victim with his consent induced solely by harassing demands and threats of violence is included
in the definition of gross income under § 22 (a)." 343 U.S. at 138.

14. "[I]t would be an extraordinary result to hold here that petitioner is to
victim and his victim paid him the money because of fear instead of fraud."
be tax free because his fraud was so transparent that it did not mislead his
Id. at 138.
15. Only a few months earlier the Supreme Court had said: "Income taxes
must be paid on income received (or accrued) during an annual accounting
period.... The 'claim of right' interpretation of the tax laws has long been
used to give finality to that period, and is now deeply rooted in the federal
tax system ....
We see no reason why the Court should depart from this wellsettled interpretation merely because it results in an advantage or disadvantage
to a taxpayer." United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592, 71 Sup. Ct. 572, 85
L. Ed. 56 (1951). This decision definitely resolved the conflict as to the
validity of the "mistake" theory as advanced by the Court of Claims in cases
where money was received through error and later returned by the taxpayer.
See, e.g., Gargaro v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. Cl. 1947). But see
Haberkorn v. United States, 173 F.2d 587, 589 (6th Cir. 1949).
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taxable gains." The distinction between the two wrongdoers, the thief
and the swindler, is the very heart of the claim of right doctrine. The
swindler's gain actually is his, because, unlike the thief, he has legal
title unless and until equity orders restitution.

PROCEDURE - GRAND JURY - MOTION TO EXPUNGE
DEFAMATORY REMARKS IN REPORT
As a result of remarks which plaintiff has made to the effect that
there was a club of "non-virgins" in a Memphis school, school authorities requested the grand jury to make an investigation. No indictment was returned, but a report was issued which recommended that
plaintiff be dismissed as a teacher in the school. Plaintiff sought by
motion to have this report expunged from the records. The motion
was denied. Held (4-1), affirmed. Though no indictment was returned,
it was within the discretion of the trial court whether or not the report
or portions thereof should be expunged. Hayslip v. State, 249 S.W.2d
882 (Tenn. 1952).
It has generally been held that a grand jury, while possessing broad
investigative powers, has no right to cast aspersions on those whom
it investigates when it does not return an indictment.' The basis for
such a rule seems to be that while a person can defend himself and
be heard on an indictment, he has no chance to answer a report.2 The
cases in this regard are numerous, and include those where the person investigated is the one censured, where a person helping in the
investigation is the one censured' and even where the person criticized was not even named.' In all such cases the offensive material
was expunged. A case holding to the contrary has been repudiated
in its own jurisdiction, and has never been followed."
Although apparently the older cases would not except even the
movent from this rule, a distinction has been drawn in two recent
cases where the person instigating the investigation was reproved. In
an Arkansas case' petitioner requested the grand jury to investigate
16. See Note, 58 YALE L.J. 955 (1949), to the effect that the claim of right
doctrine has too many "exceptions" and ought to be discarded and the revenue
law amended. See also 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOME TAxATiON § 12.103 (1942).
1. In re Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore, 152 Md. 616, 137 Atl. 370 (1927);
see In re Woodbury, 155 N.Y. Supp. 851, 853 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
2. See In re Presentment to Superior Court, Hudson County, 14 N.J. Super.
542, 82 A.2d 496, 497 (1951); In re Heffernan, 125 N.Y. Supp. 737, 738 (Co. Ct.
1909); Dession and Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41
YALE L.J. 687, 705 (1932); Note, 17 B.U.L. REv. 438 (1937).
3. Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150 N.W. 141 (1914);
In re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N.Y. Supp. 313, Sup. Ct. 1910).
4. In re Grand Jury Report, 204 Wis. 409, 235 N.W. 789 (1931).
5. In re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't 1905). Repudiated in In re Funston, 133 Misc. 620, 233 N.Y. Supp. 81 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
6. Ex parte Cook, 199 Ark. 1187, 137 S.W.2d 248 (1940).
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him. They returned no indictment, but criticized his administrative
practices. The acceptance of the report was held within the discretion
of the trial court, and his petition to expunge was denied." In another case8 the petitioner wrote to members of the bar requesting
a grand jury investigation of public officials. They found petitioner's
charges baseless, and requested that the minutes of the hearing be
transmitted to a justice for appropriate action against him. His motion
to expunge was denied; the court barely considered the plea that
he had been maligned by the report.
It seems apparent in the instant case that plaintiff was less a moving
factor than plaintiffs in the two cases cited. Thus, the distinction of
these two cases is extended to one bearing an even more remote factual
connection with the instigation of the action. The dissent' by Chief
Justice Neil, however, opposes the theory that the trial court can accept or reject a report of this kind. His opinion follows the majority of
the cases, and he draws no distinction between the acceptability of
reports regarding movents and those who are not movents.
It is difficult to ascertain whether or not this case represents a
present trend in the law. However, a change in the old rule seems
to be of doubtful desirability, since it allows a group to punish a
person without a hearing and thus accomplishes indirectly what is unconstitutional if done directly.

PROCEDURE -

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

-

RETROACTIVE OPERATION

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages under a contract between the
Commodity Credit Corporation and defendant for storage of wool.
The wool was allegedly returned in a damaged condition in 1945. This
action was brought in 1952. Prior to 1948, there was no federal statute
of limitations applicable to suits by or against the Commodity Credit
Corporation. Included in the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter
Act of 1948' was a four year statute of limitations which was extended
to six years by the Amending Act of 1949.' Defendant pleads this
7 "We think petitioner's act in requesting an investigation was responsible
for the result. True, he did not anticipate critical comment; yet, in view of
publicity given the charges, the grand jury evidently thought comment on
its finding should be made. It was within the discretion of the circuit court
to receive or reject the report." Id. at 249.
8. Application of Knight, 176 Misc. 635, 28 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Gen. Sess. 1941).

9. "While it may be true generally that the matter of expunging a grand
jury's report is within the sound discretion of the trial court, nevertheless
it is not discretionary where the report is defamatory of witnesses and no
indictment is found. No court is ever so high and mighty that the law clothes
it with discretion to say when a grand jury may defame a witness in its
official report." 249 S.W.2d at 886.
1. 62 STAT. 1070, 15 U.S.C.A. § 714b (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 154 (1949),
64 STAT. 261 (1950), 15 U.S.C.A. § 714b (Supp. 1951).
2. Ibid.
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statute in bar of the action. Held, defendant's motion to dismiss allowed. The statute operates retroactively from the date of passage,
and the action is barred. United States v. Lindsay, 105 F. Supp. 467
(D. Mass. 1952).
The courts have consistently held that a statute which, on its effective date, cuts off completely a pre-existing cause of action violates
the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts.'
To avoid this they have construed the statutes in at least three different ways. One way is to construe the statute as applying only to
causes arising after its passage and to leave all prior claims with no
bar whatever.' This purely prospective construction seems unreasonable because it defeats the purpose of these statutes, in that the defendant may never feel secure in his reasonable expectation that the
slate has been wiped clean.' Another construction is to apply the
statute only to those existing actions upon which a portion of the statutory time has already run, but which still have a reasonable period
left before the action is barred; reasonableness of this time is determined by the court.' If prior actions remain unaffected by this
interpretation, because there is no such reasonable period left, this
construction would seem little better than the first.' An Iowa statute
has been held constitutional which provided a transitional period of
six months for all prior actions to be brought, and all claims arising
after passage to be subject to the permanent two year statute." The
third method is that adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
the leading case of Sohn v. Waterson,° where it was said, "Upon principle, it would seem to be clear, that [the statute of limitations] must
commence [to run] when the cause of action is first subjected to the
operation of the statute, unless the legislature has otherwise provided."1 The Court there, in distinguishing Murray v. Gibson," made
it clear that it did not hold the other constructions to be manifestly
3. See, e.g., Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U.S. 348, 2 Sup. Ct. 62, 27
L. Ed. 378 (1882).

4. Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421, 14 L. Ed. 755 (U.S. 1853) ; cf. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 306, 28 Sup. Ct. 537, 52
L. Ed. 804 (1908).
5. Developments in the Law -Statutes

of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.

1177, 1185 (1950).
6. Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co., 132 Fed. 434, 67 L.R.A. 558 (8th
Cir. 1904) (three months held unreasonable); Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480,
123 S.W.2d 520, 120 A.L.R. 754 (1939); Merchants Nat. Bank of Bismarck v.
Braithwaite, 7 N.D. 358, 75 N.W. 244 (1898) (three and one-half months held
reasonable).
7. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 21 L. Ed. 737 (U.S. 1873).

8. Reid v. Solar Corp., 69 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
9. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 21 L. Ed. 737 (U.S. 1873); Lewis v. Lewis,
7 How. 776, 12 L. Ed. 909 (U.S. 1848); Ross and King v. Duval, 13 Pet. 45,
10 L. Ed. 51 (U.S. 1839); Carscadden v. Territory of Alaska, 105 F.2d 377 (9th
Cir. 1939) (ten year statute amended to seven years, held that plaintiff had
seven years from date of amendment).
10. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 600, 21 L. Ed. 737 (U.S. 1873), quoting
from Taney, C.J., in Lewis v. Lewis, supra.
11. 15 How. 421, 14 L. Ed. 755 (U.S. 1853).
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erroneous. The Court has not since hesitated to apply them when
ruling on cases arising in states which have adopted them.
A prospective construction does seem to be within the majority
rule on this question," and it has been often stated that there is a
presumption " against retrospective operation unless the legislature
makes manifestly clear a contrary intent." The statute in question is
worded similarly to most statutes of limitation and such wording has
generally been held not to express the clear legislative intent necessary to give them a retroactive effect."
The court in the instant case based its decision solely upon its interpretation of the legislative intent which it believes is expressed by
the use of the word "accrued." The court refused to follow a recent
construction of the same statute by another United States District
8
Court upon similar facts,"
and also cites two other federal cases which
are unreported" in which this same statute was given a prospective
construction.
Since the mere use of the word "accrued" has not generally been
held sufficient to express the "clear legislative intent" necessary to
make a statute retroactive, " and since it involves only a federal question unaffected by any state decisions, it would seem that Sohn v.
Waterson is controlling, and that the court erred in construing this
statute to be retroactive.
STATUTES

OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OVERRULEDNECESSITY FOR RE-ENACTMENT

-HOLDING

In 1923, the United States Supreme Court declared the District of
Columbia Minimum Wage Law unconstitutional.' However, in 1937
when a similar statute was before the Court, the 1923 decision was expressly overruled. - Pursuant to an opinion handed down by the At12. 34 Am. Jun., Limitation of Actions § 43 (1941), and cases there cited n.4.
13. Id. § 43 n.6.
14. Id. § 43 n.5.
15. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 21 L. Ed. 737 (U.S. 1873). In this case
the Court construed a Kansas statute worded as follows: "That all actions...
shall be commenced within two years next after the cause or right of such
action shall have accrued, and not after." (Italics added). See also Russell v.
United States, 278 U.S. 181, 49 Sup. Ct. 121, 73 L. Ed. 255 (1929). United States

v. St. Louis, S.F. & T. Ry., 270 U.S. 1, 2, 46 Sup. Ct. 182, 70 L. Ed. 435 (1926),
construed the Transportation Act of 1920 as follows: "All actions at law by
carriers.., shall be begun within three years from the time the cause of action
accrues and not after." (Italics added).
16. United States v. Bowden, 105 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ga. 1950).
17. United States v. Rabinoff, Civil No. 12290-Y, United States District Court,
S.D. Cal.; United States v. Hain, Civil No. 708-N, United States District Court,
M.D. Ala.
18. See cases cited note 15 supra.
1. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785
(1923).

2. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703
(1937).
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torney General,3 there was no legislative move to re-enact the District
of Columbia statute. Plaintiff brought this action under that statute,'
and the only defense raised was the nonexistence of such a statute in
the District of Columbia. The trial court awarded judgment to the
plaintiff. Held, affirmed. If a decision declaring a statute unconstitutional is subsequently overruled, no re-enactment is necessary to give
effect to the statute. Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1952).
A basic problem in the administration of statutory law raised by
this case is the effect to be given to a statute that has been declared
unconstitutional. When a court declares a statute unconstitutional, it
is neither repealed nor expunged from the books. The statute remains in existence but is without legal force.' The "void ab initio"
doctrine, on the other hand, states that the statute is not law and is as
inoperative as though it had never been passed." This theory has been
accepted by a few writers8 and courts,' but it has been severely criticized and limited in its application." The majority and better view
appears to be that the statute is in existence but dormant.' Thus, when
the decision of unconstitutionality is overruled,"2 the statute is revived
without the need for re-enactment.
3. Upon request of the President, the Attorney General had delivered an
opinion expressing the belief that re-enactment was not necessary to revitalize

the law. 39 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 22 (1937).

4. D.C. CODE §§ 36-401 et seq. (1951).
5. See Allison v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596, 52 Atl. 362, 363, 60 L.R.A. 564 (1902),
to the effect that the ruling on the constitutionality affects only the parties before the bar and is merely precedent for later decisions. See Crawford, The
Legislative Status of An UnconstitutionalStatute, 49 McH. L. REV.645 (1951).
That the ruling is determinative against the parties, not against the statute,
see Shepherd v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635 (1887).
6. "[A]n unconstitutional statute is nevertheless a statute; that is, a legislative act. Such a statute is commonly spoken of as void. I should prefer to call
it unenforceable, because in conflict with a paramount law." Allison v. Corker,
67 N.J.L. 596, 52 Atl. 362, 363, 60 L.R.A. 564 (1902). See Miller v. Dunn, 72
Cal. 462, 14 Pac. 27 (1887); Note, 33 CoRNELL L.Q. 281 (1947). But see 11 Am.
Ju., Const. Law § 148 (1937).
7. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178
(1886); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (U.S. 1803).
8. 1 COOLEY, CONSTrITONAL IMIATATIONs 382-84 (8th ed., Carrington, 1927).
9. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 33 Sup. Ct. 581, 57 L. Ed. 966
(1913).
10. "[S]uch broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications." Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374, 60 Sup. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329
(1940). "Reasoning along these lines is not only futile as an aid to the solution
of the procedural problem, but serves to obscure its real nature as one of law
administration." Note, 29 COL. L. REV.1140, 1143 (1929). Cf. Anniston Mfg. Co.
v. Davis, 87 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 301 U.S. 337 (1937).
11. See note 6 supra.
12. Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86 (1874); McCollum v. MoConaughy, 141 Iowa
172, 119 N.W. 539 (1909); Shepherd v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635
(1887); cf. Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 55 So. 273 (1911). See also
Crawford, The Legislative Status of An Unconstitutional Statute, 49 Micn. L.
REv. 645 (1951).
13. It is interesting to note here that although a statute may be revitalized
by overruling the decision of unconstitutionality, it cannot be brought back
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If the "void ab initio" doctrine is followed there is no further prob-

lem, since re-enactment would be necessary to revitalize the statute
and its operation would be revived at the time of re-enactment. However, the view that the statute was merely dormant may raise the
question of the effect of the statute during the interim between the
decision of unconstitutionality and the subsequent overruling of that
decision." Does the revitalized statute become effective at the time of
the overruling decision or does the decision operate retroactively to
fill the gap" of the period between the two decisions?" Blackstone
said that judicial decisions are mere evidences of the law, and an
overruled decision rather than being bad law was no law at all."7 Thus
an overruling decision does not change the law but corrects an erroneous interpretation thereof." The courts in following this theory
generally hold that the overruling decision operates retroactively. 9
However, recognizing a "conflict between legal logic and the desire
for ethical bases of justice,"'" the courts make an exception when
rights have become vested or action was taken during this period
under the "erroneous" interpretation of law."
into effect by an amendment to the constitution. Banaz v. Smith, 133 Cal. 102,

65 Pac. 309 (1901); Whetstone v. Slonaker, 110 Neb. 343, 193 N.W. 749 (1923).
But if the statute is amended to remove the unconstitutional provisions it becomes valid. Allison v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596, 52 Atl. 362, 60 L.R.A. 564 (1902);
11 Am. JuR., Const. Law § 151 (1937). If the impediment causing the unconstitutionality is removed the statute becomes effective. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572 (1891).
14. See Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
60 Sup. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329 (1940); Sunray Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 147 F.2d 962
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945); Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F.2d
497 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 678 (1941); State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454, 33 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 788 (1910); Whetstone v. Slonaker, 110 Neb. 343, 193 N.W. 749 (1923);
Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge, 195 Okla. 131, 156 P.2d 340 (1945).
15. "The rejected precedent may be regarded as never having had any validity, in which case the overruling decision would have to be applied retroactively to fill the gap in the law thus created. Or the court may consider that
the precedent now overruled was nevertheless the law until the time of its
abandonment, and that the new ruling is to apply only prospectively." Note,
Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Decision, 42 YALE L.J. 779 (1933).
16. See FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 181-97 (1st ed.

1935). Notes, 29 COL. L. REv. 1140 (1929), 37 GEO. L.J. 574 (1949), 60 HARv.
L. REV. 437 (1933).

17. 1 BL. COMM. *60-70.
18. Ibid; Legg's Estate v. Comm'r, 114 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1940); accord,
Pierce v. Pierce, 14 Ind. 86 (1874). But Blackstone's theory has been sharply
criticized: "Blackstone's attempt to . . . make decisions evidence of [law] is
unfortunate."

GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 221-22 (Rev. ed.

1921). See Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law, 17 COL. L. REV.
593 (1917), which states that the Blackstonian theory does not accord with the
growth of common law and points out that it works unjust results and hampers
the development of the law.
19. See Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1942); 14 Am. JR.,
Courts § 130 (1938).

But see FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL

STATUTE 181-97 (1935), where it is suggested that retroactive operation should
be the exception rather than the rule.
20. FIELD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 182.
21. See Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
60 Sup. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329 (1940); Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F.2d 497 (D.C.
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The Supreme Court has stated that to give retroactive effect to a
statute is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 On the other hand, the court has held that it is not
unconstitutional to give a statute only prospective operation.2 This
seems to leave the problem to the discretion of the court."4 In the instant case the court was not faced directly with this question since the
rights of the plaintiff arose after the overruling decision. The opinion
indicates, however, that the court favored retroactive operation."
WILLS - CONTEST - INTEREST OF LEGATEE'S REPRESENTATIVE

Testator bequeathed his entire estate to his wife for life, with remainder to other devisees and legatees, not related to testator. He had
obtained a judicial declaration of his wife's incompetence and had
placed her in a sanitarium, where she died five months after testator.
Her niece, administratrix of her will, thereafter filed a petition to
revoke probate of the husband's will, alleging as grounds nonexecution,
lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence of certain devisees
of the remainder of the estate. Administratrix appealed from a ruling
that she was not a proper party in interest. Held, reversed. The widow
was an "interested person" entitled to contest the will of her deceased
spouse; the widow's right of contest survived her death and could be
prosecuted by her personal representative. In re Field's Estate, 238
P.2d 578 (Cal. 1951).
The right to make a will had no common law origin but was created
by statute in 1540.1 The right to contest a will depends upon the statutes of the particular jurisdiction.! Statutes concerning will contests
vary only slightly among the states, and the language that "any person interested" may contest a will is common to all.' But as applied
Cir. 1942); Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
678 (1941); Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 14 Pac. 27 (1887); Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 55 So. 273 (1911); State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454,
33 L.R.A. (N.s.) 788 (1910); Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge, 495 Okla.
131, 156 P.2d 340 (1945); 14 Am. JuE., Courts § 130 (1938); Note, The Effect of
Declaringa Statute Unconstitutional,29 COL. L. REv. 1140 n.32 (1929).
22. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680, 50
Sup. Ct. 451, 74 L. Ed. 1107 (1930).
23. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 Sup.
Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360, 85 A.L.R. 254 (1932).
24. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60
Sup. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329 (1940). See Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions
Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARV. L.
REV. 437 (1941).
25. See 86 A.2d at 97.
1. Wills Act, 1540, 32 HEN. 8, c. 1; 2 BL. COMM. *12.

2. A few states have no relevant statutory provisions. See, e.g., In re Duffy's
Estate, 228 Iowa 426, 292 N.W. 165, 168, 128 A.L.R. 943 (1940); Lee v. Keech,
151 Md. 34, 133 Atl. 835, 836 (1926); Winters v. American Trust Co., 158 Tenn.
479, 491, 14 S.W.2d 740, 743 (1928).
3. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 370, 380 (1944); ILL. AN. STAT. c. 3, § 242
(1941); MODEL PROBATE CODE

§ 72 (1946).
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to certain contestants there is a definitesplit of authority in the interpretation of this phrase., All contestants fall into one of three categories according to the manner in which they are affected by the will.
Those who are directly affected, such as the widow, heirs, legatees
and devisees under a prior will, are considered "persons interested"
in all courts.' Those indirectly affected, such as general creditors of
an heir and those whose interest is a mere expectancy, are not considered "persons interested" in most courts.' Those not definitely in
the first two categories comprise a third group. This category, including heirs of the heirs, judgment creditors, administrators, executors
and other personal representatives of widows, heirs, devisees and
legatees, has produced the conflict.'
All states require that the interest be a "pecuniary" interest and
disallow suits based solely on sentiment.' Some courts require that the
interest must have existed at the time of the probate of the will.' The
principal issue presented in all such cases is whether the right to contest a will is a personal right or a property right. The majority of the
courts follow the view that it is a property right,' which is assignable,1
inheritable" and survives death,"2 thus including the third group as
"persons interested" within the meaning of the statutes. On the other
hand the minority take the view that the right is personal, nonassignable,' noninheritable" and abates with the death.1' It is to be
4. AncisoN, WILLS §§ 188 et seq. (1937); 2 PAGE, WILLS §§ 610, 612 (3d
ed. 1941). Estoppel to contest presents another problem. See Id. § 621.
5. ATKinSON, WILLS § 190 (1937); 2 PAGE, WILLS § 618 (3d ed. 1941). Contra:
Brooks v. Paine's Ex'rs, 123 Ky. 271, 90 S.W. 600 (1906), recognizing the refusal of an heir to contest a will as a fraud upon his general creditors.

6. For treatment of the problem involving judgment creditor of a disinherited heir, see 5 VAND. L. REV. 857 (1952).

7. In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa 426, 292 N.W. 165, 167, 128 A.L.R. 943

(1940); Hamill v. Hamill, 162 Md. 159, 159 Atl. 247, 250, 82 A.L.R. 878 (1932);
Chilcote v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 98, 119 N.E. 364, L.R.A. 1918D 575 (1918);
Dickson v. Dickson, 5 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); ATKINsON,
WILLS § 188 (1937); 2 PAGE, WILLS § 610 (3d ed. 1941).

8. Allen v. Pugh, 206 Ala. 10, 89 So. 470 (1921); Storrs v. St Luke's Hostal, 180 Ill. 368, 54 N.E. 185 (1899); McDonald v. White, 130 Ill. 493, 22
.E. 599 (1889).
9. In re Baker's Estate, 170 Cal. 578, 150 Pac. 989 '(1915) In re Riggs' Estate,'
120 Ore. 38, 241 Pac. 70 (1925), 250 P.ac. 753 (1926). In Sheeran v. Sheeran,
96 Minn. 484, 105 N.W. 677 (1905),'the court allowed the personal administratrix of a disinherited heir to appeal from probate of testator's will because
of her duty to preserve the estate.
10. In re Clark's Estate, 94 Cal. App. 453, 271 Pac. 542 (1928); Dickson v.
Dickson, 5 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Komorowski v. Jackowski,

164 Wis. 254, 159 N.W. 912 (1916).

11. In re Morrow's Will, 41 N.M. 723, 73 P.2d 1360 (1937); In re Siebs'
Estate, 70 Wash. 374, 126 Pac. 912 (1912).
12. Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 98 N.E. 177 (1912).
Chilcote v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 98, 119 N.E. 364 (1918).
13. Gain v. Burger, 219 Ala. 19, 121 So. 17 (1929); Allen v. Pugh, 206 Ala.
10, 89 So. 470 (1921); Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139
S.W.2d 935, 129 A.L.R. 316 (1940).
14. Havill v. Havill, 332 III. 11, 163 N.E. 428 (1928); Storrs v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 180 Ill. 368, 54 N.E. 185 (1899); In re Vanden Bosch's Estate, 207
Mich. 89, 173 N.W. 332 (1919). But cf. Cassem v. Prindle, 258 Ill. 11, 101 N.E.

241 (1913).
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noted that the reasoning in practically all the cases is circuitous and
begs the issue. The courts use one legal conclusion in reaching another. For example, some say the right is personal because it is nonassignable;' others that it is nonassignable because it is personal."9
The confusion is further complicated by the fact that many cases involve minors and incompetents.'
The basic question, one of policy, appears to be how far the courts
should extend the limit of those entitled to contest a will. Perhaps
the only test should be that of pecuniary interest. Admittedly the
major effect of this test would be to destroy the distinction between
judgment creditors and general creditors. Furthermore, the tests
other than that of pecuniary interest, when applied by the courts, have
resulted in dubious distinctions which cannot be supported by legal
logic or theory." The instant case follows the majority view, fully
realizing the split of authority. Because the widow had a pecuniary
interest in setting aside the will of her deceased husband, it seems a
sensible result to allow her personal representative to assert her interest against the will.
15. Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d 935,
129 A.L.R. 316 (1940); Storrs v. St. Luke's Hospital, 180 Ill. 368, 54 N.E. 185
(1899). Compare, Ligon v. Hawkes, 110 Tenn. 514, 75 S.W. 1072 (1903), holding

that an heir of the testratrix's heir, but a stranger to her blood, could not contest the testatrix's will since he could not at any time, in his own right, have
inherited from the testatrix, with Winters v. American Trust Co., 158 Tenn.
479, 14 S.W.2d 740 (1928), holding that the widow of one contestant of a will
could continue the suit although the other contestant wished to abandon it,
because under the statutes, the will, having been certified by the county
court to the circuit court for contest and probate, was of "no legal effect" and
because the suit could not be dropped since it was not an adversary proceeding
and the court must rule on the res (will).
16. Hall v. Proctor, 242 Ala. 636, 7 So.2d 764 (1942); Ex parte Liddon, 225
Ala. 683, 145 So. 144 (1932); Seldon v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 239 Ill. 67,
87 N.E. 860 (1909) 184 Fed. 872 (7th Cir. 1911); Braeuel v. Reuther, 270 Mo.
603, 193 S.W. 283 (1917); King v. King, 35 R.I. 375, 87 Atl. 180 (1913).
17. Seldon v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 239 Ill. 67, 87 N.E. 860 (1909),
184 Fed. 872 (7th Cir. 1911); Storrs v. St. Luke's Hospital, 180 Ill. 368, 54
N.E. 185 (1899).
18. Ex parte Liddon, 225 Ala. 683, 145 So. 144 (1932).
19. See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d
935, 129 A.L.R. 316 (1940); In re Siebs' Estate, 70 Wash. 374, 126 Pac. 912
(1912). It is impossible to determine how much weight the courts place on
this point of the cases generally; however, it is usually held to toll the
statute of limitations on the action.
20. "A sound method [of determining who should be allowed to contest a
will] would be first to exclude all parties who have no pecuniary interest.
If the party seeking to contest has some pecuniary interest . . . the court

should then balance the substantialness of the interest-the degree of certainty of his receiving any portion of the testator's property if the will is
invalid- against the extent to which the field of possible will contestants
will be expanded by allowing him to contest. Only in this way can protection
to persons who have some interest in the disposition of the testator's property
be given and the interest in keeping will contests at a minimum be maintained." Note, 27 IowA L. REV. 443, 450 (1942).

